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There are two reasons why I may not be the best person to criticize this paper. First, because
I have a very limited knowledge of the AI literature.
Second, because the basic approach to argument which is the core of this paper -- i.e. the
suggestion that we should attempt to understand natural language argumentation in terms of
argumentation schemes that define particular kinds of reasoning -- is an approach to reasoning to
which I am myself committed. Indeed, it is an approach that I have, often in work with Chris
Tindale, advocated for fifteen years (see Groarke and Tindale 1986; Groarke and Tindale 1989
and 1997; and Groarke 1999).
Given my own commitment to the general approach to reasoning defended in this paper, and
my relative lack of knowledge of the literature on AI, I will have to focus my remarks in this
commentary on the particular approach to argumentation schemes which Reed and Walton
suggest. To this extent I shall try to further our discussion here by offering two brief criticisms of
their approach, and by ending with a concluding remark.
Questions or Answers
The conception of argumentation scheme which Reed and Walton offer describes an
argumentation scheme as a “pattern of reasoning,” a “form of argument,” or a “structure of
inference.” So far so good. According to the account they develop, an argumentation scheme is
paired with a set of “critical questions” which is used to assess any instance of a scheme. While I
think it is possible to understand argumentation schemes in this way, I want to begin by noting
that we do not need to place such a conceptual emphasis on the role of critical questions in
understanding argumentation schemes.
Imagine an argumentation scheme, let’s call it A, which is accompanied by a set of critical
questions, Q1...Qn. We have a good instance of argumentation scheme A if and only if we can in
this instance answer questions Q1...Qn in an appropriate way. Let’s call the appropriate answers
A1...An. Looked at from this point of view, we can describe an argumentation scheme as a
pattern of reasoning which depends on a set of propositions A1...An. These propositions may be
presented as explicit premises in the argument but they may – like many of the assumptions that
argumentation depends on – be left implicit.
Looked at from this point of view, we can identify an argumentation scheme as a pattern of
reasoning which fits a pattern of reasoning which is to be identified by identifying, not the
critical questions which should be asked about it, but the kinds of premises it must implicitly or
explicitly depend on. Of course, the critical questions that Reed and Walton associate with
argumentation schemes arise in due course, for they arise as soon as we ask whether the premises
the inference depends upon are true or probable or plausible. That said, there is no need to
formalize argumentation schemes by the indirect route of identifying these questions when we
can identify the premises they require directly. By identifying the premises directly we can place
argumentation schemes into a well understood framework of arguments, premises and
conclusions.
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Deductive or Non-Deductive?
Once we understand argumentation schemes in the way I have proposed we can better
understand some issues raised by the motivation that Reed and Walton give for their own
conception of argumentation schemes. They propose argumentation schemes as a way to
incorporate non-deductive and non-monotonic forms of reasoning. In the present context, I will
leave the issue of monotonicity aside. Suffice it to say, ordinary reasoning is non-monotonic and
any account of it must somehow account for this. This does show that something beyond
classical logic will have to be used in attempts to formalize natural language reasoning. I believe
that issues of tonicity highlight requirements that show that good inferences in natural language
require, not only premises that imply the proposed conclusion, but also a set of premises which
meets some standard of consistency and coherence. But this is a matter I leave for elsewhere.
In the present context, I will only address the question of deductivism. Here there are
misconceptions buried in the present paper, which associates deductive reasoning with certainty.
This is a common confusion but it is a confusion. The validity of a deductive inference does not
ensure the certainty of the conclusion, but only that it is as certain as the premises. Thus the
argument:
“This is an argumentation paper completed this month. All argumentation papers
completed this month are outstanding papers. This is an outstanding paper.”

is a deductive argument which is valid. But we would doubt the conclusion, because we are
likely to doubt the premises, and particularly the second.
It is in this context worth noting that it is a mistake to think that deductive reasoning is
indelibly associated with the kind of reasoning that characterizes classical logic and
mathematics. Such reasoning is equally as important in moral contexts (in the case of two
wrongs reasoning, for example, which is discussed as a scheme in Groarke 1999), which are just
the sorts of contexts in which argumentation theory needs to develop and exercise its ability to
understand natural language reasoning.
It is easy to see how all argumentation schemes can be understood as deductive as soon as
we move beyond the assumption that deductive inference is tied to certainty. For any
argumentation A, which depends on propositions A1...An (which are answers to critical
questions Q1...Qn), can be understood as the inference:
A1,... An
If A1 &....An, then C
Therefore C
where the C is the appropriate conclusion. It is wrong to think that this manner of
understanding argumentation schemes undermines the subtleties of probative argument which
Reed and Walton claim to capture by argumentation schemes. For these subtleties are
automatically incorporated in the description of the scheme, for they are reflected in the nature of
the premises (A1,...An) required for the conclusion.
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A Concluding Comment
None of this is meant to deny the basic point made in this paper – that an approach to
argument which focuses on argumentation schemes can be a powerful tool which will help us
better understand and assess natural language reasoning both in pedagogical and AI contexts. To
this extent argumentation theory should devote itself to the attempt to identify, define and
formalize argumentation schemes and a theoretical framework in which they can be understood.
In my own opinion, it will be particularly important to develop two facets of a theory of
argumentation schemes. The first is some clearer method of identifying argumentation schemes
in natural language discourse -- especially as arguments are in these contexts often expressed in
ways which are vague, ambiguous and capable of being understood in terms of different
argumentation schemes.
The second is some taxonomy of argumentation schemes which allows us to better
understand how different argumentation schemes are related to one another, and which do or
should take precedence in particular argumentation contexts. There is a great deal of work to be
done, but papers like the present one may push us in the right direction.
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